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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Medical savings accounts (MSA5) have recently received considerable pol-
icy attention as an alternative approach to improving the efficiency of indi-
vidual spending decisions for health care. The Health Insurance Portability
and Responsibffity Act includes specific tax incentives to support theuse of
MSAs on a limited basis beginning in 1997. We review the implications of
such tax incentives for insurance and health care purchasing decisions. We
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then focus on a crucial equity consideration: the extent to which the feasibil-
ity of MSAs is limited by the persistence of medical expenditures over an
individual's working life. We conclude that persistence does not present
an overriding impediment to MSAs.Finally, we consider other key behav-
ioral issues that wifi be important in evaluating such plans.
1. INTRODUCTION
Efforts in recent years to limit the growth in medical expenditures of the
privately insured have relied primarily on managed care. Managed care
plans feature various "supply-side" regulations and financial incentives
for providers to limit excessive spending on medical care that might
otherwise result from generous health insurance. The plans typically
include low or negligible out-of-pocket payments by the insured. In-
deed, current federal law prohibits health maintenance organizations
from employing any substantial deductibles and copayments. The appar-
ent success of these plans in controlling private-sector expenditure
growth in recent years (Levit et al., 1996) has led many analysts to
conclude that, despite administrative costs and interference in doctor-
patient interactions at the time of illness, such "supply-side" methods
may be the best means of avoiding many of theinefficiencies of health
insurance (e.g., Zwanziger and Melnick, 1996).
Following Arrow (1963), however, a number of economists and policy-
makers, concerned perhaps with growing public or private regulation of
medical care, have considered tax reforms to encourage more "demand-
side" incentives (Gramm, 1994; Feldstein and Gruber, 1995; Pauly and
Goodman, 1995). To permit a trial of one such reform, the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Availability Act of 1996,commonly known as the
KennedyKassebaum legislation, includes the establishment of tax in-
centives for medical savings accounts (MSA5) on a very limited basis,
beginning in 1997.1
The principal motivation for MSA tax incentives is to make insurance
plans with high deductibles and copayments more attractive to a larger
number of Americans. Participation rates in such "catastrophic" or
major-risk plans have usually been low, compared to traditional fee-for-
service or managed-care plans, when offered by employers. There are
several reasons for low participation. First, most individuals appear
quite risk-averse in their preferences for health insurance. One impor-
tant cause may be the minimal levels of liquid assets held by most
households (see, e.g., Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996a), so that signifi-
1HR 3103 in the 104th Congress, which was renamed the Health Insurance Portability and
Availability Act, was signed by President Clinton in August 1996.Medical Savings Accounts93
cant uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical expenditures could bea
daunting prospect. Second, the current tax treatment of health insur-
ance favors low-deductible plans. Employer-provided health insurance
is financed with pre-tax dollars, so that individualsare likely to choose
more coverage than they would if they faced the full price of insurance.
Moreover, because out-of-pocket payments for medicalcare are only
deductible if they exceed 7.5% of income, tax law favors plans that
minimize out-of-pocket payments. Favorable federal tax treatment of
MSAs would counteract these obstacles to the purchase of health insur-
ance with substantial out-of-pocket payments.2
An MSA is a tax-favored individual or family savings account intended
primarily as a reserve for medical spending. The MSA is typically coupled
with an insurance plan that covers very large medical expenditures only;
smaller expenditures are paid for out of the MSA. Assets remaining in the
MSA at retirement, or when the insurance is superseded by Medicareat
age 65, are available for other purposes, like general consumption in
retirement. Because a larger share of their actual medical expenditures
would be financed from their own savings, individuals would bemore
sensitive to costs of treatment over a larger range of expenditures. An
MSA thus combines the desirable features of catastrophiccoverage for
reducing medical expenditures with a mechanism that createsa reserve
for paying individual expenses. Thus an MSA coupled witha catastrophic
insurance plan may reduce medical expenditures and encourage saving.
To the extent that catastrophic insurance costs less than moregenerous
plans, the MSA will also induce lower insurance costs.
In this paper, we analyze MSAs in some detail. In the next section,we
illustrate how the MSAs envisioned in the KennedyKassebaum legisla-
tion would work in practice. We describe the important features of MSA
tax incentives, and then discuss how these incentives might affect indi-
vidual behavior. In section three, we consider a critical issue that is likely
to determine the ultimate success of MSA plans in promotingmore
efficient use of health care. We emphasize the potential implications of
persistence in individual medical expenditures and the resulting equity
implications of MSAs for individuals covered over long time periods.
Long-term accumulations in MSAs will only be equalacross individu-
als if they are fully insured against medical expenseswhichencour-
2At least 13 states have already enacted tax breaks for MSAs, but these reforms have
involved much lower state marginal tax rates. Existing federal law also allows employers to
establish "flexible spending accounts," which permit employees to use pretax dollars for
out-of-pocket medical expenditures. However, balances not spent at the end of theyear
are lost, so that employees tend to rely on them in a limited way for predictable expenses
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ages inefficient use of medical careorif the individual illnesses and
associated medical care expenditures average out over time. In anygiven
year, only a small minority of non-elderlyindividuals face major ifi-
nesses. If the same individuals are likely to beill year after year, MSAs
could result in large differences in accumulations in MSAs. On the other
hand, if different individuals experience health shocks randomly over
time, MSA balances would not accumulate unevenly despitethe appar-
ent lack of complete insurance at any point in time.In that case, over a
longer time period or a working lifetime, an MSA plan wouldprovide
relatively desirable incentives to use medical care, yet would not gener-
ate substantial inequality in MSA accumulations.
Because individual health shocks clearly vary, the feasibilityof an
MSA plan depends on whether the gains (improved incentives foreffi-
cient health care spending and increased savings) outweigh the costs
(more variation in individual health care expenses) than under more
generous insurance plans. Indeed, theproblem of persistence in health
care expenditures, and the resultingselection of the healthy into MSAs,
has been a frequent criticism of MSA plans (e.g., Moon,Nichols, and
Wall, 1996). Our results suggest that, at least for the vast majorityof the
employed non-elderly population, persistence is not so extreme as to
make such plans infeasible.
Many other complex issues surround the design andimplementation of
an MSA-based insurance scheme, or anyother health insurance reform
designed to make individuals more financially sensitive to their medical
choices. In the fourth section of the paper, we review the implicationsof
some of these issues for the successof MSA-based insurance reforms. In
general, these issues involve empirical questions about the likely magni-
tudes of desirable and undesirable effects of MSAs offered togetherwith
alternative insurance plans. For the moment, insufficientevidence exists
to reach firm conclusions about many of them. In theconcluding section,
we consider whether and how theMSA experiment envisioned in the
Kennedy-Kassebaum legislation may help shed light on these issues.
2. AN INTRODUCTION TO MSAs
2.1 Features of an MSA Plan
The Health Insurance Portability and Availability Act (HIPAA)includes
provisions to allow a limited test of tax incentives for the establishmentof
MSAs. This legislation can be used to ifiustrate some of the key featuresof
MSAs and their associated catastrophic insurance plans, and the tax incen-
tives for their use. In subsequent sections, we explore theimplications of
MSA reforms for equity and efficiency in the health care sector.2.1.1 Restrictions on Eligible Health Insurance Plans Toprevent mdi-
viduals from using the MSA simply as a tax break in conjunctionwith
traditional health insurance, thereby defeating thepurpose of the tax
incentives, MSA tax incentives must be accompanied by restrictionson
the maximum generosity of the associated health insurance plan.Con-
versely, if no minimum generosity of the associated planwere required,
enrollees might be encouraged to relyon charity care or publicly-
provided health care in the event of a major illness. In theHIPAA,
eligible plans for individuals must include a deductible ofat least$1,500
and no more than$2,250,and an out-of-pocket maximum (OPM) ofno
more than $3,000. For family MSAs, the allowable deductiblesrange
from $3,000 to$4,500and the OPM is$5,500.Federal restrictions on the
financial liability that managed-care plansmay impose on enrollees will
prevent health maintenance organizations from offering MSA-eligible
plans under the HIPAA. However, it is easy to imagine "combination"
MSAs that are purchased in conjunction with managed-care plans that
feature substantial out-of-pocket payments for medical services. If MSAs
do become more popular, the emergence of combined plans mightbe
expected on the basis of both self-selection (e.g., individuals with low
risk of mental ifiness might not want topay for a plan that provides
unlimited catastrophic coverage for mental illness) and efficiency (e.g.,
managed care for mental illness may do a better job of targeting psychiat-
ric care to individuals for whom it is worthwhile than high deductibles).
2.1.2 Tax Treatment of MSA Contributions, Accumulations, and Bal-
ances The tax-favored status of MSA contributions might consist of
either a tax deduction, as is accorded to traditional health insurance,or a
tax credit. Because the value of a deduction increases with the marginal
tax rate, it is more valuable to higher-income families. The tax incentive
might involve MSA contributions, earningson MSA balances, or the
MSA balance itself.3 The HIPAA allows tax-deductible contributionsof
up to65%of the insurance plan deductible for an individual MSA and
75% of the insurance plan deductible fora family MSA in each year. The
MSA earnings are not taxed on accrual, and there isno maximum
amount beyond which a tax on the MSA balance is imposed.
2.1.3 Tax Treatment of MSA Withdrawals Most MSA plans alsoenvi-
sion tax-favored status for MSA withdrawals for medicalexpenses, and
penalties for withdrawals for nonmedical use. These featuresare not
required but obviously strengthen the tax incentive touse an MSA for
Pauly (1994) discusses these tax issues in detail.
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medical care. The definition of medical expenses inthe HIPAA is based
on current IRS law, andthus includes many types of expenditures such
as eyeglasses, dental care,rehabilitation, mental health care, and other
services that are not covered generously by mosthealth insurance plans
today. Withdrawals from the MSA fornonmedical spending are treated
as taxable income andalso face an additional 15% tax penalty under the
HIPAA. However, individuals can make withdrawalsfor nonmedical
uses without penalty beginningat age 65 or if disability occurs, and
balances at death are not subject to tax penalties.
2.1.4 Obstacles to Switching Out of the MSASome medical expenditures
are predictable (e.g., a womanwho is or expects to become pregnant may
join a plan with generous maternity coveragein that year), and the timing
of some discretionary expenditures maybe adjustedbased on tax and insur-
ance incentives (e.g., anindividual with osteoarthritis may postpone a
joint replacement operation until he can join aplan with a relatively low
deductible). Features to discourage such switching once anindividual is
enrolled in an MSA include longer "lock-in periods" (e.g.,requirements of
advance notice of one or more years before leaving theplan) and tax incen-
tives (e.g., prohibitions against roffing over MSAbalances into subsequent
insurance purchases). Such obstades implylarger long-term financial
risks, which may discourage enrollment. Weconsider the likely magnitude
of long-term financial risks in the next section.The FIIPAA does not in-
clude explicit lock-in periods, but it does not allowMSA funds to be used to
purchase a noneligible plan without penalty. Thus, anindividual who de-
cides to switch out of the MSA would have to treatthe remaining MSA bal-
ance as taxable income, withthe 15% penalty.4
2.1.5 Choice RestrictionsConcerns about the self-selection of healthy
individuals into MSAs have led to some proposals torestrict or require
the availability of certain alternative plan choices inconjunction with the
MSA. Clearly, the selection of only the healthymembers of a firm or
other population into an MSA could beeliminated by requiring all pro-
spective enrollees to join. Alternatively, to limit thefinancial liability of
individuals with chronic illnesses who have persistentlyhigh demands
for health care, a firm or the government couldestablish a subsidy for
individuals with certain chronic ifinesses, paid for byhealthier individu-
als. The HIPAA does not include any restrictions onthe set of plan
choices that individuals or employees maybe offered as alternatives to
In addition, as we discuss in Section 4, simply having an existingMSA balance creates a
lockin effect; it is easier to get individuals to stay than to join.Medical Savings Accounts97
MSAs, and such restrictions do not appear likely in any further insur-
ance reforms in the near future. As we discuss below, however, the
selection problem associated with MSA availability may not be as great
as the selection problem when only managed-care plans are available.
2.1.6 Eligible Persons MSA tax incentives could be offered to the
whole population, the nonelderly population, or particular subgroups;
tax incentives could also differ according to patient health characteristics
(e.g., disability) or income characteristics. Because the MSA component
of the HIPAA was explicitly designed as a limited MSA trial, enrollment
is open only to firms that averaged 50 or fewer employees in either of the
preceding two years, and to the self-employed. These individuals are
less likely to be covered by generous indemnity or managed-care plans,
and so might be expected to find managed-care plans more appealing. In
addition, the small size of their risk pools suggests that offering MSAs
could not do much to worsen any problems of adverse selection in these
small groups. The HIPAA also caps total enrollment in MSAs at 750,000
accounts,5 and only provides for new MSA plans to be available from
1997 to 2000. The bill also excludes the elderly. In Section III, we con-
sider some implications of these substantial limitations on availability for
what may be learned from the MSA trial.
2.2 Incentive Effects of MSAs
A brief description of the incentives to use medical care in an MSA
compared to other types of health insurance illustrates the potentially
important behavioral responses to this new tax policy. It also provides
a foundation for describing the distinctive features of self-selection into
health plans that may arise when an MSA choice is available. Figure 1
plots an individual's out-of-pocket medical expenses as a function of
his or her total medical expenditures in two alternative health plans.
For reference, the ray OA plots total medical expenditures in the ab-
sence of any insurance or tax deductibility. An illustrative "traditional"
insurance plan features a $250 deductible and 20% copayment up to a
$1000 out-of-pocket maximum. An illustrative catastrophic insurance
plan, which would fall within HIPAA requirements for use in conjunc-
tion with an MSA, features a $2000 deductible.6 In the traditional plan,
individuals bear the full cost of their first $250 of expenses (OB), then
face a price of 0.2 times the price of medical care for their next $3750 of
Actual enrollment might substantially exceed 750,000 because MSA availability will end
only in the year after the cap is exceeded.
6MSA-associated plans may also indude copayments after the deductible is met; for
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FIGURE 1: Comparison of Illustrative Plans
medical expenditures (BC, the copayment range), and then face a price
of zero for expenditures after they reach the out-of-pocket maximum
(OPM).
Because medical expenditures from the MSA are deductible, individu-
als who have positive but low medical costs face a lower (after-tax) cost
than they would in the traditional plan. Suppose that the individual in
our illustrative case has a marginal tax rate of 0.33. Then her netout-of-
pocket payments are lower over a range (OD) of low expenses; in this
example, point D occurs at an expenditure level of approximately $450.
A higher deductible in the alternative plan or higher marginal tax rate
would cause point D to shift to the right, making the MSA appear even
more favorable for those expecting low expenditures.8
Assume for the moment that the MSA enrollee had no existing MSA
balance prior to making the full amount of the tax-deductible contribu-
That is, expenditures under the alternative plans are equal at the level x such that 0.67x =
250 + 0.2(x-250).
8Under current tax law, MSAs are even more favorable because of the "medical" expendi-
tures described previously that are not generally covered under traditional plans but that
would be deductible in the MSA. For example, individuals expecting high rehabifitation
expenditures might find an MSA particularly attractive.
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tion in the current year. The HIPAA allows MSA contributions in this
case of up to $1300 (that is, $2000 X 0.65); thus, the individual's medical
expenses remain subsidized by her marginal tax rate up to $1300 (the
range OE). Spending beyond $1300 up to the plan's OPM is not subsi-
dized; over this range, the individual bears the full cost of medical ex-
penses (EF). If an MSA balance of at least $700 was carried over from the
previous year, of course, medical expenses would be tax-subsidized up
to the plan's out-of-pocket maximum. Thus, the individual's maximum
after-tax payments under the $2000-deductible MSA plan would be $1571
($1340 if her initial MSA balance was at least $700). The area OEG repre-
sents the tax expenditure associated with the deductibility of MSA with-
drawals. Remaining expenditures beyond $2000 are fully covered by the
catastrophic plan.
For individuals expecting high medical expenditures, just as for indi-
viduals expecting very low medical expenditures, a higher marginal tax
rate or lower out-of-pocket maximum in the catastrophic plan makes it
appear more attractive relative to the alternative traditional plan. For
example, suppose that the plan's out-of-pocket maximum was $1500
(also an allowable plan under the HIPAA), and consider the after-tax
liability of an individual expecting medical expenses over $4000. Then, if
the individual had a balance of at least $525 in the MSA at the beginning
of the year, her after-tax medical expenditures would be the same in the
MSA plan as in the traditional plan; if she had no initial balance but a
marginal tax rate of at least 0.513, she would still face lower after-tax
liability in the MSA plan.
These medical expenditure comparisons have not considered the dif-
ference in premium prices. Because the catastrophic plan features insur-
ance payments that are the same or much lower than the alternative plan
at most expenditure levels,9 the traditional-plan premium is likely to be
higher, perhaps much higher. Thus, even in the original example ($2000
deductible), an individual expecting very high medical expenditures
might be better off choosing the MSA.1° MSA plans are not necessarily
unattractive or risky to the chronically ifi, particularly those with high
In the example discussed in the text, for expenditures between $250 and $2000, the
catastrophic plan pays zero while the traditional plan pays 80%. For expenditures between
$2000 and $4000, the catastrophic plan pays 100% while the traditional plan pays 80%.
Thus, at any level of medical expenditures above $250, total plan payments will be higher
in the traditional plan, and so a fair premium for a given individual would be higher in the
traditional plan. We consider the effects of plan selection on the premiums momentarily.
10This would be the case if the alternative plan premium were at least $571 higher, if the
individual had no initial MSA balance, and at least $340 higher if the individual had an
initial balance of at least $700.100Eichner, McClellan & Wise
marginal tax rates and those whose alternative-plan choices are not very
generous.
The persons who are most likely to be worse off in the MSA are those
with low marginal tax rates and middle-range expenditures, for which
the traditional plan provides substantial relief through copayments. For
example, lower-income individuals who have frequent ambulatory medi-
cal care use, a single outpatient surgical procedure, or a brief hospital
stay would likely face the greatest difference in out-of-pocket medical
expenses under the MSA plan.
For most of the nonelderly today, the likely alternative to an MSA is
not a "traditional" plan but a variety of managed-care plans. Such plans
generally feature very low out-of-pocket payments, making them rela-
tively attractive to individuals with high marginal tax rates compared to
traditional plans with significant out-of-pocket payments. In this con-
text, MSAs level the playing field (Pauly, 1994): the deductibility of MSA
spending removes the tax wedge between choosing a plan that relies on
"supply-side" versus "demand-side" incentives to limit medical expendi-
tures. Removing the tax wedge in this way, rather than by limiting the
deductibility of premiums for managed-care plans, comes at the expense
of narrowing the tax base. Given the limited out-of-pocket liability in
most plans offered by employers today, however, this narrowing may
not impose a very high cost in tax expenditures.
Further, the low out-of-pocket liability of managed-care plans does
not necessarily make them more attractive for those at high risk of a
serious illness. Because they wifi tend to select a managed-care plan
with higher-quality care, the premium of the plan they select is likely
to reflect both the higher cost of providing this care and the selection
of other relatively ill individuals into this plan. Relative to healthy
individuals, these enrollees would place higher value on the less-
restricted care provided by catastrophic insurance should they become
seriously ifi.
Indeed, MSAs can provide a kind of "safety valve" to limit the extent
of self-selection that can occur when a population with varying health
risks chooses among more-generous and less-generous plans. Intu-
itively, the attractiveness of MSAs to low-risk and high-risk individuals
compared to those with moderate health risks would appear to be a
useful feature for limiting self-selection into plans.
Simulations by Nichols, Moon, and Wall (1996) provide quantitative
support for this effect. Nichols et al. use representative U.S. data on the
distribution of medical expenditures across employees to simulate the
consequences of an employer offering a choice between a low-OPM
traditional plan and a high-OPM MSA plan. Their high-OPM plan placesMedical Savings Accounts101
the enrollee at risk of up to $750 in additional out-of-pocket payments.11
They find that if individuals who actually have low expenditures enroll
disproportionately in the MSA, the premium for the comprehensive
plan may rise dramatically relative to the premium for the MSA plan. For
example, if all those with low medical expenditures join the MSA, leav-
ing only the "bad risks" in the traditional plan, then the premium differ-
ence between the plans would increase from approximately $600 with no
risk selection ($1701 for the traditional plan, $1110 for the MSA plan) to
over $6,000 with massive adverse selection into the traditional plan.
Such large differences in premiums between the traditional and MSA
plans are not sustainable. Not counting the tax subsidy for MSA spend-
ing, the heaviest users of medical care face a maximum out-of-pocket
difference in expenditures between the two plans of only $750, the differ-
ence in the OPMs. With the tax subsidy, this difference is even smaller
perhaps not much larger than the original difference in premiums in the
case of no selection. As soon as self-selection causes a premium differ-
ence of at least this magnitude to emerge, the sickest individuals in the
population will join the healthiest in choosing the MSA plan.
The inclusion of an MSA option in a set of alternative plans differs in
an important way from the health plan choices that most employees
currently face, between managed-care plans that differ in quality or re-
strictiveness. Currently, there is little incentive for the most ill to join the
plan chosen by the healthiest individuals in a group even if the premium
difference becomes very large, because the low-quality plan does not
subsidize high-quality intensive treatment regardless of the level of ex-
penditures incurred. This absence of a safety valve can result in the
"death spiral" of the premium of the most generous plan in a set of
managed-care alternatives (e.g., Price and Mays, 1985). The fact that
unrestricted catastrophic plans becomes attractive to the severely ill at
only a moderate level of adverse selection into the more-generous plan
restrains the premium spiral. The chronically ill would generally be bet-
ter off if an employer offered a single plan that requires the entire popula-
tion to pooi together, but if that option is not available, an MSA may
provide an effective bound on the magnitude of the selection problem. 12
In particular, they compared a "comprehensive" plan with a $250 deductible and $1250
OPM to an MSA plan with a $2000 deductible, close to the comparison described in the text.
12Note that the "safety valve" effect of an MSA plan only arises when the least-generous
plan among the available choices is the MSA. In contrast, if the healthiest individuals could
switch to an HMO of very low quality, they may not stay in the MSA plan along with the
very ill. Even in this case, however, implementing an MSA along with imposing some
restrictions on minimum HMO quality may reduce the extent of self-selection across plans
compared to a set of managed-care alternatives alone.102Eichner, McClellan & Wise
This discussion of the features of an MSA plan and their incentive
consequences indicates that MSAs, at least as envisioned in the HIPAA,
are unlikely to have truly catastrophic financial consequences for individu-
als at a point in time. Compared to the problems of high premiums caused
by self-selection into managed care plans, the severely ill and others with
high medical demands may not be that much worse off in an MSA plan in
any given year, especially if they are in high tax brackets. In the next
section, we evaluate the possible long-term consequences of MSAs for the
distribution of medical expenses and savings accumulations.
3. PERSISTENCE AND MSA FEASIBILITY
Within the context of an illustrative MSA plan, we develop preliminary
empirical evidence on the distribution of medical expendituresand
hence savingsunder an MSA plan. Our analysis is based on longitudi-
nal health insurance claims data from a large firm. In this analysis, we
assume no behavioral response to the increased cost sharing under an
MSA plan. We return to this important issue in the next section. To the
extent that individuals respond to price incentives, expenditures will be
more equalperhaps substantially more equalthan our results sug-
gest. Thus, our goal is to provide an upper bound on expenditure varia-
tion, as measured by variation in MSA accumulation.13
We first consider summary data on the persistence of medical expendi-
tures. Then we describe the model that we have used to predict the
distribution of "lifetime" expenditures and consider how well the model
captures the distribution of actual expenditures. Finally, we present
simulations of lifetime health care expenditures and MSA account bal-
ances at retirement.
3.1 The Data
The analysis is based on medical claims of employees in a large Fortune
500 manufacturing firm. We use all fee-for-service insurance claims over
the three-year period 1989 through 1991. Over this period approximately
300,000 employees and their dependents were covered through these
insurance plans. All reported inpatient and outpatient medical expendi-
tures for this population are included in our analysis.14
13 Much more detail on the evidence in this section is presented in Eichner, McClellan, and
Wise (1996).
14 We do not include dental services, vision care, or outpatient pharmaceuticals, which
account for approximately 15 percent of medical expenditures (Levit et al., 1996). Because
these expenditures are relatively less concentrated in particular individuals than other
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FIGURE 2: Mean Annual Expenditure (Persistence) by 1989 Decile
The firm has two relatively generous fee-for-service plans, one for
hourly and another for salaried employees. The hourly plan, with bene-
fits negotiated in union contracts, provides "first-dollar" coverage for
virtually all health care. The salaried plan has an annual deductible of
$200 per individual and $250 per family, a 20% coinsurance rate for all
expenses, and an out-of-pocket annual limit (including the deductible)
of $5u0 per family. Both plans incorporate limited case management for
certain high-cost medical conditions and concurrent review of hospital
stays.
3.2 Summary Descriptions of Persistence
Do employees who had high expenditures in one year (in our example
1989) have high expenditures in subsequent years as well? This is called
persistence. To begin, we have divided plan enrollees into deciles based
on 1989 claims. Figure 2 shows average annual expenditures in 1989, in
1990, and then in 1991, all by 1989 expenditure dedile. Consider employ-
ees who had expenditures in the top decile in 1989. In that year, their
average expenditure was $11,249. In the next year, their average expendi-
ture was $4,786 and two years later in 1991 they spent an average of
Medical Savings Accounts103
to a more concentrated distribution of medical expenditures in this population. Indeed, to
the extent that such expenditures are not covered by traditional plans, their eligibility for




I II III Iv V V VIIVIIIIxx
Decile
FIGURE 3: Mean Annual Expenditure (Persistence) by 1991 Decile
$3,489. Persons in the tenth decile in 1989 spent over eight times as
much as the average in that year. They spent close to five times the
average in 1990 and almost three times the average in 1991. Thus these
data show two important regularities: employees in the top decile con-
tinue to have expenditures well above the average over the next two
years, but there is also a substantial, almost three-fold, decline in aver-
age expenditures over these three years for this group.
On the other hand, employees with the lowest expenditures in 1989
had higher expenditures in the next two years. For example, those in the
bottom three dediles, who spent nothing in 1989, had expenditures near
the average two years later in 1991. In all deciles, expenditures tend to
gravitate toward the mean. Only in the top decile do expenditures re-
main substantially above the mean for three years.
Rather than considering the subsequent expenditures of employees
conditional on expenditure level in 1989, an alternative is to consider
previous expenditures conditional on expenditures in 1991. Figure 3 is
analogous to Figure 2, but shows expenditures in 1989, 1990, and 1991,
all by 1991 expenditure decile. What were the prior expenditures of
employees in the top dedile in 1991? Did they also have higher than
average expenditures in the previous two years? The answer is yes, but
whereas the expenditures of employees in the top dedile in 1991 were















Percent Distribution of 1989 and 1991 Expenditures.
Joint distribution of 1989 and 1991 expenditures
$0 8.89 13.66 5.39 3.45 1.72
$0-$300 15.03 8.58 4.29 2.62 1.24
$300-$1000 5.71 3.80 3.44 2.39 1.11
$1000-$5000 3.95 2.27 2.27 2.61 1.25
Above $5000 2.12 0.95 0.89 1.20 1.17
Distribution of 1991 expenditures conditional on 1989 expenditures
$0 26.8441.27 16.28 10.43 5.19
$0-$300 47.3327.02 13.50 8.24 3.91
$300-$1000 34.72 23.06 20.91 14.55 6.77
$1000-$5000 31.94 18.39 18.38 21.13 10.15
Above $5000 33.50 15.01 14.09 18.90 18.49
Distribution of 1989 expenditures conditional on 1991 expenditures
$0 24.89 46.69 33.10 21.13 26.42
$0-$300 42.1029.32 26.34 21.31 19.11
$300-$1000 16.01 12.97 21.13 19.52 17.15
$1000-$5000 11.06 7.77 13.95 21.28 19.30
Above $5000 5.94 3.25 5.48 9.76 18.02
their average expenditure was only about 2.4 times the average. Simi-
larly, persons with the lowest expenditures in 1991 had expenditures
near the average two years earlier. Thus Figure 3 is almost the mirror
image of Figure 2.
Another way to view persisten1 to consider the distribution of
employees' expenditure intervals for two different years. Table 1 shows
the distribution for 1989 and 1991 for all employees. Expenditures in
each year are divided into five intervals, and three versions of the distri-
bution are shown. The first panel shows the joint distributions of expen-
ditures in the two years. For example, 8.89% of employees had zera
expenditures in both years, 15.03% had expenditures between $0 and
$300 in 1989 and zero expenditures in 1991. (The percentages sum to 100
over all cells.) The most important part of this panel pertains to the
fraction of employees who had high expenditures in both years. About
6.22% had expenditures above $1,000 in both years, and only 1.17% had
expenditures above $5,000 in both years. Thus only a very small propor-
tion of employees have high expenditures in one year as well as two
years later or two years earlier.
The data also show persistence, consistent with the data in Figures 2
and 3. The second panel of Table 1 shows the distribution of 1991 expen-
Expenditure Expenditure interval in 1991
interval in 1989 $0$0-$300$300-$1000$1000-$5000Above $5000106Eichner, McClellan & Wise
ditures by expenditure interval in 1989. For example, 18.49% of persons
who spent more than $5,000 in 1989 also spent more than $5,000 in 1991,
whereas only 5.19% of persons who had no expenditures in 1989 spent
more than $5,000 in 1991. Rather than lookingforward, as in the second
panel, the third panel of Table 1 looks backward; it shows the distribu-
tion of 1989 expenditures by expenditure interval in 1991.Although only
a small proportion of employees with expendituresabove $5,000 in 1991
also had high expenditures two years earlier in 1989, these employees
are more likely to have had high expenditures two yearsearlier than
were persons who had low expenditures in1991. For example, 18.02% of
employees who spent more than $5,000 in 1991 had also spent more than
$5,000 two years earlier, whereas only 3.25% of employeeswho spent
nothing in 1991 had spent more than $5,000 two years prior.
The features of the data described above are consistent with the
known high concentration of medical expenditures in any given year.
Although only a very small proportion of employees have high expendi-
tures in the first and third years, for example, the meanexpenditure
among the top percentiles is very large. Thusin any one year, about 20%
of enrollees in our sample account for about 90% of totalhealth care
costs. What our data allows, in contrast to cross-sectional data sources,
is the analysis of individual expenditures over time. Even over alonger
period of time, a small proportion of enrollees account for thebulk of
expenditures. Again, this is because even over an extended period of
time only a small proportion of enrollees have large expenditures,and
thus the few that do account for a large fraction of the cost. Wefind that
over a three-year period, 20% of employees accountfor about 80% of
total cost. Based on the formal model predictions described below, we
find that even over a working lifetime, about 20% of employees account
for almost 50% of total costs.
3.3 A Model of Expenditures
Our goal is a formal description of medical expenditures that will allow
us to simulate the pattern of expenditures overthe working life, based
on the persistence observed over three years. Webegin with a descrip-
tion of the model and its use to predict expenditures. A critical feature of
the model is the extent to which it captures actual expenditure patterns.
Thus we give considerable attention to how well the model predictions
capture the actual level and, most important, the actual distributionof
health care expenditures. Finally, we describe the simulations of lifetime
expenditures and MSA balances based on the model.
There are two critical aspects of health care expenditures that the
model must capture. One is the relationship between expenditures inMedical Savings Accounts107
successive years, the persistence in expenditures. The other is the
random shocks in health care expenditures that are not predicted by
prior expenditures or by demographic variables. No matter what the
expenditures of employees in prior years, there is an enormous varia-
tion in expenditures the next year. Thus enrollees with no expendi-
tures in one year stand some change of having very high expenditures
in the next year. Likewise, enrollees with very high expenditures in
one year stand a good chance of having very low expenditures in the
next year. Indeed, the lifetime distribution of expenditures is deter-
mined much more by these random shocks than by persistent expendi-
tures that are predictable based on prior expenditures or demographic
characteristics.
Because a large fraction of employees have no expenditures in a given
year, it is useful to consider explicitly the expected value of expenditures
in year t M, given by
E(M) = Pr[M = 0] X 0 + Pr[M > 0] X E(M I M> 0) (1)
We estimate the independent components of this equationPr[M> 0]
and E(M I M > 0)separately. The probability of nonzero expenditures
is estimated using a linear probability specification, and the level of
expenditures given that expenditures are positive is estimated using a
log linear regression. In both cases, the estimated relationship is of the
form
Mt=U+D+YMiag+E (2)
where medical expenditures in year t, M, are predicted by three factors:
(1) demographic characteristics, denoted by D, and which include age,
sex, and employment status (hourly or salaried); (2) past health care
expenditures Miag, which in this version include expenditures in years
t 1 and t-2; and (3) random shocks E.
The critical part of our analysis is the use of the resulting estimates to
predict future expenditures. The "fit" of these predictions depends not
only on our ability to model expected expenditures given an individual's
characteristics, but also the distribution of shocks to expenditures. We
want the distribution that is used in prediction to "match" the actual
distribution as closely as possible, and this distribution is extremely
skewed within any given cell of expenditures. We model this critical
"error" component nonparametrically: instead of assuming a particular
distribution for the random shocks E, we use the actual distribution of
expenditure errors, given demographic characteristics and past expendi-108Eichner, McClel km & Wise
tures.15 Thus, the method captures not only the average relationship
between expenditures over time, but if high expenditures persist for
some proportion of persons with a given set of demographic and past
expenditure characteristics, then the model will also capture the propor-
tion with high persistence. Predictions for years beyond year three are
obtained by repeated applications of this procedure.
How could the predictions be improved? First, better predictors of
expenditures (e.g., additional data on individual health characteristics
and use of medical care) might improve the predictions of expected
future expenditures, given past expenditure. For example, having a
longer panel of claims data would permit us to construct groups with
longer expenditure histories.16 We believe, however, that while a longer
panel wifi allow a more accurate prediction of the pattern of regression
to the mean after an expenditure shock, it would not have much effect
on the overall persistence that the model now suggests. Second, we
could augment our model with information from other sources on the
relationship between medical care use over very long time periods. For
example, are heart problems at age 50 preceded by high health care
expenditures at age 30? No available panel of medical claims information
can be used to determine directly whether such a relationship exists.
However, we can observe expenditures in the next two years of persons
that had high expenditures at age 30, as in the second panel of Table 1.
And, going to older ages and looking backwards, we can observe the
expenditures in the previous two years of persons who had high expen-
ditures at age 50. Both of these approaches suggest that, for the most
part, very high expenditures do not persist. Thus we believe that our
predictions provide a good approximation to the distributions that
would be observed in very long panels.
15For example, consider the prediction of expenditures in the third year, given expendi-
tures in the prior two years. The sample is divided into groups determined by age, sex, and
employee status (hourly or salaried). Then within each of these groups the sample is
further divided into 25 expenditure groups defined by expenditures in the prior two years.
Now the prediction of expenditure in year three has two parts. First, the parameters
estimated in equation (2) are used to predict mean expenditures in year three. This "system-
atic" part would show, for example, that enrollees with high expenditures in year one
tended on average to have much lower expenditures two years later, as revealed in Figure
2. Second, a random shock is added to this systematic component. Within each cell, the
random component is selected randomly from the actual distribution of residuals within
that cell.
Suppose that the prediction is for enrollees who had high expenditures in years one and
two. This method assures that if a given proportion of persons in this high expenditure cell
have high expenditures in the third year, then our predictions will also show this same
proportion (on average) to have high expenditures in the third year.
16We are now constructing panel data with six years of expenditures rather than three.Medical Savings Accounts109
3.4 Comparing Actual and Predicted Means and Distributions
We first consider how well the model matches the actual subsequent
mean expenditures of persons who had high expenditures in year one.
For illustration we have chosen all persons aged 35 with expenditures
over $10,000 in 1989. We then used the model to simulate their expendi-
tures in the ten subsequent years. We compared the predictions in the
subsequent two years with the actual data. For the first two years, for
which we have matching actual data, the actual and simulated means are
very close. The lag structure in the model is of course a way to extrapolate
the decline in expenditures to future years. The simulations imply that
after 4 or 5 years the expenditures of persons with large shocks approach
the overall sample mean. The simulated and actual "decay" patterns are
shown in Figure 4, along with a similar depiction for 45 year olds.
We also considered the future expenditures of persons with specific
1989 diagnoses that are typically associated with high expenditures, to
determine if the expenditure pattern in these cases appeared consistent
with the model's predictions. We considered the following diagnoses in
1989: Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI), cancer, mental health (with
inpatient care), and pregnancy. Only 45% of 1989 AMI patients had
expenditures greater than $1,000 one year later in 1990, only 34% had
expenditures greater than $1,000 two years later in 1991. (Over 14% had
zero expenditures in 1990 and 25% in 1991.) Less than 25% of cancer
patients had expenditures over $1,000 in 1990 and only 20% in 1991.
There was more persistence in the expenditures of inpatient mental
health patients: 54% had expenditures over $1,000 in 1990 and 42% in
1991. Pregnancy is one of the most important contributors to firm health
care costs, but with minimal persistence. Only 17% of women with
pregnancy-related diagnoses in 1989 had expenditures over $1,000 in
1990 and only 13% in 1991. We take these results as evidence that our
simulated decay rates are not unreasonable. In particular, we find no
reason to suspect that they are too rapid.
Second, we consider actual and simulated average expenditures by
age for hourly and salaried men and women. The actual averages are
based on the full sample of 230,497. The simulated averages are deter-
mined as follows: begin with a sample of 1,000 employees age 25. Then
apply the prediction procedure described aboveusing equation (2) re-
peatedly and with random selection of residualsto produce a stream
of expenditures for each person through age 60. The simulated averages
for a given age are the averages of the simulated values at that age. The
results for salaried men are shown in Figure 5. Because the simulated
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FIGURE 4: Decay Patterns Following Large Expenditures
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FIGURE 5: Annual Expenditures Salaried Males
variation in the simulated than the actual averages, but the overall match
seems quite close. Results for other gender and employee groups are
essentially the same.
Third, we consider how well the predicted distribution of expenditures
in the third year, conditional on demographic variables and expenditures
in the first and second years, matches the actual distribution in the third
year. In particular, we were interested in determining whether our model
underpredicted persistence. Such comparisons were made for persons at
ages 30,40,50, and 60 for hourly and salaried men and women. The actual
and predicted distributions for persons age 60 are shown in Figure 6.
Overall, the simulated and actual distributions are very similar. The re-
sults for the other age groups are essentially the same.
Fourth, we considered how well lifetime predictions, which produce
levels and distributions of expenditures at each age, match actual levels
and distributions observed at particular ages. Our subsequent simula-
tions rest on the prediction of the expenditures of employees over a
working lifetime. This comparison is intended to test the long-run impli-
cations of the model. We start with the expenditures of a sample of














































































































































































































































































































































































































through age 60. We want to know in particular that the distribution of
simulated expenditures approximates the actual distribution at older
ages. Figures 7 shows simulated versus actual distributions at age 55
for hourly and salaried men and women. Overall, the distributions of
simulated expenditures are very close to actual distributions. That is,
starting with persons age 25, repeated application of the model yields
predicted expenditure distributions 30 years laterat age 55that look
very much like the actual distributions for persons who are now 55.
Given the small (1,000) sample used for the simulations, simulations
based on different samples yield somewhat different comparisons. But
our general experience has been that there is no appreciable difference
in the overall results.
3.5 Simulated Lifetime Expenditures and MSA Balances
We have simulated the lifetime expenditures of 1,000 employees who
begin work at age 25 and retire at 60. We realize that few, ifany, persons
would work for the same firm for that length of time, but it is the
expenditure pattern that we want to capture, assuming that employees
continued to use similar MSA plans.
The distribution of cumulative expenditures for salariedmen at age 60
is shown in Figure 8, in which the logarithm of expenditure is shown.
Translating to dollars, over a working lifetime, expenditures of salaried
men vary from less than $10,000 (about 10% of employees) to over
$100,000 (about 10% of employees). The median is about $32,000. The
distributions for the other gender and employee statusgroups are simi-
lar to those for salaried man.
Given the distribution of expenditures described above, how mightan
MSA plan work? We consider this plan:
The employer puts $2,000 in each employee's MSA at the beginning of each
year.'7
The health insurance plan has a $4,000 annual deductible, withexpenses be-
low the deductible paid by the employee (out of the MSA) and 100 percent of
expenditures above the deductible covered by the health insurance plan. If the
MSA balance goes to zero, all expenses are paid by the insurance plan.
We assume that employees do not withdraw from their MSA balances for otherpur-
poses, or contribute less than the full $2000 in each year. This allows us to focus on the
maximum variation in accumulation that is likely to result with this MSA plan. In practice,
employees who accumulate relatively large savings "buffers" may be less likely to continue
to contribute the full amount. This behavior would reduce the variation in accumulations
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FIGURE 9: MSA Balances (Dollars) Salaried Males at Age 60116Eichner, McClellan & Wise
The distribution of MSA balances for salaried men at age 60 isshown in
Figure 9. After a working lifetime, most employees areleft with a sub-
stantial accumulation. About 90% of the employees have a balance at age
60 that exceeds $25,000, while 75% have more than$40,000 and 50%
have more than $50,000. The distributions are similar for salaried women
and for hourly employees.
Another way to understand the plan implications is to consider the
proportion of MSA contributions that remain at selected ages. The distri-
bution of this proportion for salaried men is shown in Figure 10. At
retirement, only about 20% of employees have less than 50% of their
contributions, about 10% have less than 35%, and about 5% less than
20%. And, 50% still hold more than 70% of their MSA contributions.
The average balance remaining in the MSA or salaried men is shown
by age in Figure 11. At age 60, the average is about $46,000. The amount
by age can be compared to the 45-degree line which representsthe
accumulation path if there were no withdrawals to cover health care
costs. Although not precisely the same, the pattern is similarfor salaried
women and for hourly men and women.
3.6 MSA Plans in the Health Insurance Portability and
Availability Act
The MSA provisions in the HIPAA are discussed in section 2above. We
have simulated two plans that are consistent with the HIPAA provisions
and a third that is not strictly consistent with the Act. The firstplan
assumes that employees (in our firm)face a deductible of $1,500 (and
pay nothing above the deductible)and contribute $972 each year to an
MSA. The second plan assumes that employees face adeductible of
$2,250 (and pay nothing above the deductible) and contribute$1,463
each year to an MSA. The average medical expenditure of employeesin
our firm is about $1,300. Thusneither of these insurance plans provides
truly catastrophic coverage only. The third plan we simulate features an
annual deductible of $3,000 and an annual MSA contribution of $1,950.
The out-of-pocket maximum of this plan is allowed in the HIPAA, but its
deductiblelimited to $2,250 for individuals in the HIPAAis higher
than the allowable amount. We follow the HIPAA in setting the maxi-
mum annual MSA contribution to 65% of thedeductible, so that our
third plan includes a larger MSA contribution than the legislation per-
mits. In addition, all of these simulations, including theKennedy-
Kassebaum plans, assume that if the MSA is depleted, then all expendi-
tures are paid by the insurance plan; this is notprovided for in the
Kennedy-Kassebaum bill. (Below, we show that out-of-pocket expendi-
tures not paid from the MSA are very small.)Medical Savings Accounts117
FIGURE 11: Mean MSA Balances by Age Salaried Males
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FIGURE 12: MSA Balances (Dollars) "KennedyKassebaum" MSA Pro-
visions Salaried Males at age 60
Figure 12 shows the distribution of MSA balances at age 60for each of
these versions. Figure 13 shows the distribution of the percent oflifetime
contributions remaining in the MSA at age 60. (Figures 12and 13 are
analogous to Figures 9 and 10 respectively, which present the keyresults
of our plan with a $4,000 deductible and a $2,000 annualMSA contribu-
tion.) Some key features of all four plans are summarized inTable 2. As
in the EMW Base plan, in none of the KennedyKassebaumplans do we
find a large proportion of employees with extremely low balances, nor
an extremely large proportionwith very high balances. In particular, the
differences between the balances of employees most likely andleast
likely to incur medical expenditures do not seem to us so great as to
make such plans infeasible.
The distribution of expenditures is the same in each of the plans; no
behavioral response is allowed in these simulations. Thus the balances
remaining are simply the result of the MSA contributions and the insur-
ance deductibles. Larger MSA contributionsincrease the remaining bal-
ance at retirement and larger insurancedeductibles reduce the balance.
The effect of different deductibles on the balance depends on the propor-Annual contribution: $972 Annual Deductible: $1500
Annual Contribution: $1463 Annual Deductible: $2250
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FIGURE 13: IHA Balances (Percent of Contributions) "Kennedy-
Kassebaum" MSA Provisions Salaried Males at Age 60
TABLE 2







Plan Deductible $4,000 $1,500 $2,250 $3,000
MSA Contribution $2,000 $972 $1,463 $1,950
MSA Balance at 60:
10% Below $26,079 $8,560 $18,762 $30,234
10% Above $60,988 $27,266 $43,617 $60,683
MSA % of Contributions
Remaining at 60:
10% Below 36% 12% 26% 42%
10% Above 85% 38% 61% 64%120Eichner, McClellan & Wise
tion of expenditures between one deductible andanother. For example,
the EMW Base plan assumes a $4,000 deductible and theKennedyKasse-
baum plan 2 assumes a $2,250 deductible. The effect of thisdifference on
expenditures depends on the proportion of total expenditures thatfall in
the $2,250 to $4,000 interval. Because only a smallfraction of total expendi-
tures falls in this interval, increasing thedeductible does not increase
expenditures enough to offset the large MSA contribution$1,463 versus
$2,000. Thus the percent of balances remaining at retirement issubstan-
tially higher in the EMS Base than in the KennedyKassebaum plan 2.The
large balances under the KennedyKassebaum plans 2 and 3, relative to
those under plan 1, are explained in a similar manner.
The EMW Base plan provides that if the MSA balance is zero,all
expenses are paid by the insuranceplan. The KennedyKassebaum bifi
does not include such a provision; if the MSA balance isdepleted, ex-
penses are paid out-of-pocket, but notfrom the MSA. Table 3 shows that
such out-of-pocket payments are likely to be very small. Forexample,
under the KennedyKassebaum plan 1, 96.68% of persons age25 to 29
have no such expenditures 1.32% have expenditures of $500 orless, and
2% have expenditures between $501 and $1,500. There are noexpendi-
tures above $1,500. The bulk of out-of-pocketexpenditures are made by
persons age 25 to 29, who havehad only a few years of MSA contiibu-
lions. Such expenditures under plans 2 and 3 are even lower.
3.7 Proportion of Cost Subject to Payment byEnrollee
The principal reason that a catastrophic insurance plan islikely to re-
duce expenditures is that enrollees are using their own money(in the
MSA) to pay for care. The simulations above do not take accountof this
behavioral response. We do not attempt to analyze that issue here, but
we do present data that mayhelp to place the issue in context. One
way to get a rough idea of theproportion of costs that would be subject
to full payment by the enrollee is to considerthe proportion of annual
individual expenditures that fall below the deductible. For example, in
the KennedyKassebaum plan 1, any person who incurred costsless
than $1,500 would pay all of those costs. The proportion ofindividual
expenditures below selected levels, together with the proportionof
individuals with expenditures below these levels, is shown in Figure
14. Although about 85% of individuals have expendituresbelow the
KennedyKassebaum plan 1 deductible, these enrollees account for a
small fraction of total expenditures. Only about 12% of expenditures
are below this level. About 25% ofexpenditures are below the EMW
Base plan deductible of $4,000 dollars. These proportions simplyreflect
an important feature of medical expendituresalarge fraction of costsMedical Savings Accounts121
TABLE 3
Kennedy-Kassebaum Out-of-Pocket Expenditure Not Paid from the
MSA: Percent of Expenditure by Plan and by Age
Age Expenditure Interval
Interval None $0-$500 $501-$1500 $1501-$5000
Kennedy-Kassebaum Plan 1: $1500 Deductible and $972 Annual MSA
Contribution
25-29 years 96.68 1.32 2.00 0.00
30-34 years 99.76 0.18 0.06 0.00
35-39 years 99.80 0.14 0.06 0.00
40-44 years 99.74 0.18 0.08 0.00
45-49 years 99.58 0.16 0.26 0.00
50-54 years 99.38 0.24 0.38 0.00
55-60 years 99.40 0.33 0.27 0.00
Kennedy-Kassebaum Plan 2: $2250 Deductible and $1463 Annual MSA
Contribution
25-29 years 97.40 0.76 1.84 0.00
30-34 years 99.92 0.02 0.06 0.00
35-39 years 99.92 0.06 0.02 0.00
40-44 years 99.72 0.08 0.20 0.00
45-49 years 99.68 0.06 0.26 0.00
50-54 years 99.62 0.10 0.28 0.00
55-60 years 99.78 0.03 0.20 0.00
Kennedy-Kassebaum Plan 3: $3000 Deductible and $1950 Annual MSA
Contribution
25-29 years 98.96 0.24 0.80 0.00
30-34 years 99.94 0.00 0.06 0.00
35-39 years 99.96 0.04 0.00 0.00
40-44 years 99.88 0.00 0.12 0.00
45-49 years 99.82 0.02 0.16 0.00
50-54 years 99.80 0.06 0.14 0.00
55-60 years 98.98 0.00 0.02 0.00
are accounted for by a small proportion of persons who incur very high
costs in any one year. If the deductible were set much higher, say at
$10,000, about 45% of costs would be subject to full payment by the
enrollee.
4. OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR EVALUATING
MSAs
In the analysis reported in Section 3, we assumed no behavioral responses
to the change in incentives to use less medical care that the adoption of an
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FIGURE 14: Percentage of Individuals and ExpendituresFalling Below
Specified Levels
MSAs when alternative plans are also offered to employees. Because
MSAs have not yet been implemented, we have no direct evidence on
how large these behavioral effects wifi be. Here, we outline someof the
key behavioral questions for evaluating the effects of MSAs on medical
expenditures and on the financial risk faced by individuals who might
choose them. These questions are not unique to MSAsindeed, they are
important concerns for any type of health reformbut MSAs do present
some distinctive features that we highlight.
4.1 Sensitivity of Medical Spending to Changes in Price
Incentives
As Figure 1 suggested, over a large range of expendituresfrom the
level of the deductibles of the alternative plans to level of the OPM ofthe
MSA planindividuals in MSAs wifi bear a substantially higher shareof
the cost of the medical care they consume. On the other hand, over
some ranges the price of medical carewill be lower. A reduction in after-
tax price wifi occur for individuals who are "on the margin" atlowMedical Savings Accounts123
expenditure levels that are below the deductible of the alternative plans.
Assuming that (as current policies envision) MSAs relymore heavily on
high deductibles than on copayments over a large range of expenditures,
the reduction will also occur for sicker individuals whoare "on the
margin" above the expenditure level associated with the MSA's OPM,
but below the expenditure level associated with the traditional plan's
OPM.18 Finally, because the definition of medical expenses is broader
under IRS tax law than in most existing health insurance plans, the MSA
would lower the price of all expenditures on some types of medicalcare.
Because of such countervailing price effects, Keeler et al. (1996)con-
clude that the net effect of moving the non-elderly population of insured
employees into MSAs would yield a modest but noticeable reduction in
expenditures, on the order of 0% to 13%. The American Academy of
Actuaries (1995) reaches similar conclusions, predicting cost reductions in
the range of 2% to 13%. Nichols, Moon, and Wall (1996) estimatea slightly
larger effect, around 15%. These estimates were basedon assumptions
about the price sensitivity of different kinds of medical expenditures,
drawing on results from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (Bu-
chanan et al., 1991), and from plan pricing methods used by the American
Academy of Actuaries. Feldstein and Gruber (1995) have estimated consid-
erably larger expenditure effects. They considered the adoption of MSAs
with insurance plans that are considerably more "catastrophic" than
those envisioned in the HIPAA. For example, one of their plans featureda
deductible equal to 10% of family income, which is much larger than the
HIPAA allows for higher-income families. They considered somewhat
larger estimates of the price elasticity of demand for medical care. Many of
the studies do not account for the tax subsidies the MSAs provide for out-
of-pocket medical expenditures and for services not covered in typical
insurance plans.
Are the existing empirical estimates of price elasticity valid for evaluat-
ing MSAs? There is some evidence that creating a pool of the employee's
"own" money may lead to larger effects than extrapolations from data
on traditional insurance plans would suggest. For example, in recent
This situation is analogous to the countervailing incentive effects of quickly phasing out
a low-income tax credit or welfare payment (and thereby providing more substantial distor-
tions to a smaller share of potential workers) versus slowly (and thereby providing smaller
distortions to a larger share). The type of MSAs described here provide relatively strong
disincentives to overconsumption of health care at relatively low levels (e.g., up to $2000),
but the greater dependence on deductibles relative to copayments means that the disincen-
tives go away early compared to plans with relatively greater reliance on copayments.
Figure 1 illustrated this point, e.g., in the $2000 to $4000 range of expenditures. The
optimal combination of deductibles and copayments in an MSA plan is another important
empirical question.124Eichner, McClellan & Wise
years Dominion Resources hascreated an "account" for health care
costs; if firm expenditures end up belowthe budget amount, employees
who did not exceed the plan deductible receive a share of thesurplus. In
the plan's first year, costs were 31% under budget, suggesting asubstan-
tial effect from creating the pool (American Academy of Actuaries,1995).
Whether employees would spend money from their own account more
carefully than under a traditional insurance plan with copaymentsis an
unresolved question in general.
Similarly, are the MSA tax incentives of the HIPAA optimal for improv-
ing efficiency? For example, would some form of taxcredits coupled
with limitations on the deductibility of expenditures represent abetter
targeting of tax expenditures? Should the MSA beavailable for use in
conjunction with managed-care plans? Few simulationsand even less
empirical evidence exists on such important details ofMSA-related tax
reforms.
Further research on these questions would be helpfulfor determining
the optimal structure of an MSA plan. Some analystswill probably con-
clude that the rather low "sub-catastrophic" limits onout-of-pocket
spending in the HIPAA do not permit a full evaluationof the potential
gains from MSA plans. Higher deductibles andout-of-pocket maxi-
mums, as some analysts have supported,could subject a much larger
share of medical expenditures to payment withindividuals' own money,
requiring MSA withdrawals, rather than payment by ahealth insurance
plan, perhaps leading to larger efficiency gains. But greaterpersonal
liability might discourage individuals who expect significantexpendi-
tures from signing up for MSAs, relative to theMSAs in HIPAA. In any
case, it is unlikely that evidencefrom the HIPAA "experiment" alone
will resolve these issues.
4.2 Plan Selection Effects
No recent legislation and few firms have proposedcompulsory enroll-
ment in an MSA plan. When MSAs are offeredin conjunction with alter-
native traditional fee-for-service or managed-care insuranceplans, the
consequences for medical expenditureswill also depend on the propor-
tion of medical costs that are paid for with enrollees own moneyout of
their MSA accounts. As the discussion in Section 2 and ouranalysis of
persistence in Section 3 suggested, MSAs wifi look attractive tothe very
healthy, but in many realistic circumstances they may also seemadvanta-
geous to those expecting veryhigh expenditures. Indeed, in simulations
that implicitly accounted for the "safety valve" effect,Keeler et al. (1996)
observed only modest adverse selection for plans withrelatively low
catastrophic deductibles, in the range envisioned by the HIPAA.As weMedical Savings Accounts125
noted previously, however, simulations reported to date show that alter-
native assumptions about the extent to which the healthy will selectan
MSA can have a substantial impact on the predicted savings. In addition,
the deductibility of MSA withdrawals in the HIPAA means that the net in-
centive to join an MSA increases substantially with income; the magni-
tudes of this income effect on MSA selection and spending are not known.
4.3 Costs of Risk Bearing
To the extent that individuals do face higher after-tax prices when they
are ill, they lose the benefits of income smoothing that more generous
insurance would provide. Based on fairly generous assumptions about
how risk-averse individuals are to income disruptions of several thou-
sand dollars per year, Pauly (1994) and Keeler et al. (1996) conclude that
the "insurance cost" of MSAs such as those envisioned in the HIPAA
was likely to be modest in any given year. Our simulations suggest that,
at least for the vast majority of the nonelderly population, they are also
modest over longer time periods, even for MSAs that impose consider-
ably more liability for medical expenses. On the other hand, MSAs to
date have not been very popular as an approach to limiting medical
spending. An important empirical question is the extent to which tax
subsidies to encourage the establishment of MSAs and to remove the tax
wedge between plans that use supply-side and demand-side incentives
will affect plan choice behavior.
4.4 Nonmedical Incentives to Join MSAs
Because individuals who do not spend MSA balances on medicalcare
may use the funds for other purposes, MSA tax incentives may provide a
shelter for accumulating additional savings. The penalties for with-
drawal before age 65 limit the value of the tax break for the nonelderly,
but they may be attractive for individuals who otherwise would have to
face high marginal tax rates on earnings or who have exhausted other
tax shelters for retirement savings. To illustrate, consider an individual
in a 50% marginal tax bracket who joins the MSA described in Section 2
and remains in it for 30 years (until he withdraws it without penalty at
age 65), earns a real return of 5% on the MSA balance, and has $800 per
year in medical expenditures. Because he can contribute $1300 of pretax
income to the MSA each year, he will accumulate $20,930 in after-tax
savings upon withdrawal. In contrast, a pretax contribution of $500 toa
regular savings account with taxable interest would only have led toan
accumulation of $14,700. Because the accumulation difference increases
with both the magnitude of the allowed contribution and the tax rate,
the KennedyKassebaum MSAs will be relatively attractive to higher-126Eichner, McClellan & Wise
income individuals, not only because of the lower after-tax price of medi-
cal expenditures but also because of the greater gain from savings.
The relatively stringent caps on annual MSA contributions in the
KennedyKassebaum bill imply that individuals should not be able to
enjoy huge gains in savings accumulations from the tax break. However,
allowing higher out-of-pocket limits and MSA contributions would ac-
centuate these tax differences. Would the resulting MSAaccumulations
represent new savings, or simply a relabeling of retirement savings in
response to the tax break? The weight of the evidence isthat the bulk of
IRA and 401(k) retirement saving plan contributions have been net new
saving (Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1996a, 1996b). Whether the same
would be true of the MSA is not clear. It would depend, for example, on
whether the MSA were set up independently of existing retirement sav-
ing plans. In that case, the existing evidence suggests that it would
induce new saving. Even if these savings were "new," they would come
at a cost in tax expenditures associated with the MSAprovisions. The
magnitudes of these effects on savings and tax expenditures have not
been assessed.
4.5 Transition Costs
Because relatively few employees have existing buffers of savingsfor
medical or other unexpected out-of-pocket expenses, MSA plans are
likely to appear less attractive to many workers at the outset than they
would once some savings were accumulated in them. For example, em-
ployees might be substantially more likely to join an MSA plan that gives
them an initial balance equal to the catastrophic plan's out-of-pocket
maximum when they first join. Since most employees would notspend
the full balance in the first year, they would become "locked in" to the
MSA: the penalty for withdrawing the balance lowers the cost of continu-
ing in the MSA relative to switching to another plan. Such one-time
incentives might be very helpful in encouraging takeup of MSAs,but
evidence on the magnitude of such liquidity effects will not comefrom
the HIPAA, in which only a fixed fraction of the out-of-pocket maximum
may be contributed in any year.
4.6 Effects on Expenditure Growth
Simulations of MSA plans to date have modeled one-time effects on
medical expenditures. To have a consequential long-term impact on
medical costs, MSAs must affect expenditure growth as well. The cur-
rently low rate of enrollment in catastrophic plans and the limited scope
of the HIPAA bill implies that MSAs in the near future areunlikely to
cause systematic changes in medical practice. Thusthe limited use ofMedical Savings Accounts127
these plans will probably have no effect on the principal determinantof
long-term expenditure growthtechnological change. Incontrast, as
managed-care plans have become widespread, theyappear to have led
to systemic effects on medical expenditure growth. Because MSAsare
unlikely to become nearly so widespread in thenear future, evidence on
the comparative performance of MSAs relative to supply-sideincentives
is unlikely to emerge in the near future.
5. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed MSA plans, focusing on the provisions and incentives
inherent in the Health Insurance Portability and Availability Act.The
analytic core of the paper suggests that persistence in individual medical
expenditures does not present an important roadblock to the feasibility of
MSA plans. Over a working lifetime, our simulations suggest that MSA
reforms are unlikely to have substantial adverseconsequences for the vast
majority of nonelderly employees. The persistence of high medicalexpen-
ditures does not appear to be a major obstacle to the widespread adoption
of MSA plans. In future work, we intend to explore in detailthe conse-
quences of MSA reforms for the small fraction of individuals who do face
high expenditures year after year. We also noted that adverseselection
problems might be less extensive with MSA options than insituations
where employees are allowed to choose among managed-care plansonly.
Many other considerations are also important in determining thepoten-
tial of MSAs to improve efficiency in healthcare. We discussed some of
these difficult issues to highlight the additional evidence that isneeded
for a more comprehensive evaluation of MSAs.
These considerations suggest that, while the MSA provisionsin the
HIPAA will provide some important insights into how MSAs willwork
in practice, they will not permit a complete analysis ofmany of the key
empirical issues that will determine the effectiveness of potential MSAs.
The HIPAA insurance plans will generally be sub-catastrophic, andso
they can provide only limited information about how truly catastrophic
plans would work. In addition, the HIPAA allows onlya limited number
of MSA accounts to be established, so that the MSAscannot have sys-
temic effects on medical practice, as managedcare is having now. Fur-
ther, compared to existing insurance plans, the net effect of takingup
one of the new MSAs on the after-tax price of medical care is likely to be
relatively small. Large differences across MSA enrollees inasset accumu-
lations are also unlikely. As a result, the HIPAA is probably bestre-
garded as an initial partial test of the feasibility of MSA plans: Will they
be taken up, and if so by whom? Wifi there be disastrousconsequences128Eichner, McClellan & Wise
for the health or financial status of those who joinand for others in their
firms or risk pools? We suspect that the new MSAplans in HIPAA will
be reasonably attractive to eligible individuals,especially those in higher
tax brackets and who face high premiums now,and that the conse-
quences of their switching tothese MSA plans will be modest.
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